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1 At the end of April 1999, Chinese hackers
hijacked several US government websites.
They replaced home pages with messages
such  as  “Protest  USA’s  Nazi  action!
Protest  NATO’s  brutal  action!”  In  the
midst  of  the  war  in  Kosovo,  this  was
retaliation for the accidental bombing of
the Chinese embassy in Belgrade by NATO
forces.  In  July  2006,  following  a
controversy  over  the  handling  of  anti-
Japan gamers’  pseudonyms,  users  of  the
online game Fantasy Westward Journey decided to organise a demonstration inside the
game, drawing more than 80,000 players onto the same play area and virtually chanting
offensive slogans. Anti-Japanese sentiment had been rife since the 2005 protests against
Japan’s bid to gain a seat in the UN Security Council. The booming Internet ecosystem
had  played  a  role  in  bringing  people  to  the  streets,  especially  forums  with  a
nationalistic undertone such as Strong Nation Forum (Qiangguo luntan 强国论坛).
2 Ever since the Internet started to develop in China, nationalism has been a prominent
feature of the online ecosystem (Wu 2007). These events have long been a theoretical
puzzle, as they contradict some of the early optimism about the rise of a democratically
oriented civil society online (Yang 2003; Lagerkvist 2005). Indeed they highlight that
the Chinese cyberspace is a complicated and contentious space, just like any cyberspace
in the world.
3 Two books published respectively by Han Rongbin and Florian Schneider in 2018 bring
new empirical and theoretical insights into the question of online nationalism and shed
a useful light on the competing ideologies, aspirations, and norms that populate the
Chinese Internet. They use very different theoretical and methodological approaches to
address this topic. Although nationalism is not directly the focus of Han Rongbin’s book
Contesting Cyberspace in China, it occupies several chapters and constitutes one of the
most interesting and original takeaways of his study. 
 
Overview 
4 Han Rongbin takes issue with the conceptualisation of  the political  Internet as one
opposing civil society and the state, a Manichean view that dominated much of the
scholarship  on  the  topic  during  the  2000s.  Instead,  he  proposes  an  entry  through
“discourse competition.” He endeavours to disentangle the institutions and actors that
play a role in shaping online discourse. 
5 In this,  he follows the lead of previous books that have foregrounded the merits of
using an interactionist approach to understand the complicated logics through which
online discourses are deployed (Yang 2009). While official media have clearly lost their
monopoly over the public agenda, and the public sphere hosts more diverse sets of
norms than before the Internet (Lagerkvist 2010), scholars have already argued that
this is  more about liberalisation than about democratisation (Zheng 2008),  and that
framing  logics  mean  that  state-sponsored,  nationalist  norms  are  bound  to  be
mainstream online (Arsène 2011). Criticising the “state versus society” paradigm thus
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sounds like a straw man argument. The insistence throughout the book on repelling the
illusions of the “resilience” theory means that it remains the reference point of the
book, at the risk of failing to open new perspectives on the question. Still, ten years
after  these  publications,  Han’s  book  is  a  welcome  update,  because  much  of  the
landscape  has  changed,  with  new  institutions,  giant  corporations,  millions  more
Internet users on their mobile phones, and a much savvier, control-oriented leadership
in power. It constitutes a clear, readable, up-to-date reference book on these issues.
The book focuses particularly on forums (BBS) and comments. Those platforms have
been around for about twenty years now, but they are still vibrant places in terms of
public debate.  Han draws on 60 online and offline interviews with participants and
moderators, as well as online ethnography.
6 Florian Schneider’s book China’s Digital Nationalism focuses more directly on nationalist
content published online. He places the discussion at a more theoretical level, with the
ambition  to  make  it  a  relevant  case  study  beyond China,  and to  contribute  to  the
literature with insights on what the digital  does to nationalism. Indeed, the second
chapter is devoted entirely to a theoretical discussion of nationalism, conceptualised
here  as  a  “political  technology,”  one  that  is  the  result  of  “a  lengthy  process  of
construction, innovation, and negotiation, driven in no small part by elites and their
self-interests”  (p.  32).  The  formation of  nationalism is  mostly  a  discursive  process,
whereby emotions, perceptions, and psychology play a great role in people’s identity
building, so the role of digital communications is decisive.
7 Florian Schneider focuses in particular on two issues that represent two typical facets
of Chinese nationalism: the memory of the Nanjing massacre, and debate around the
Diaoyu Islands,  a  hot  topic  around 2012.  Florian Schneider  applies  both qualitative
methods such as content analysis of mainstream websites and platforms and interviews
with industry insiders and academics, and quantitative methods such as issue crawling
and network visualisation. 
8 Chapters are organised along a series of case studies involving different ways to collect
and analyse data. This reads as a journey through all  the platforms and filters that
shape the information available to Chinese Internet users about the Nanjing massacre
and the  Diaoyu  Islands.  The  book  exemplifies  a  growing  trend  of  applying  digital
methods to provide objective,  quantified measurements of  social  phenomena,  while
also crossing that information with qualitative insights from interviews and content
analysis. 
9 Through different materials and methods, both books address the effects of censorship
in framing nationalist discourse online, and how this is intricately combined with the
political economy of the Internet, platforms’ commercial biases, and design choices.
They also both study examples of online controversies, where user-generated content
offers  a  glimpse  into  the  psychology,  collective  identity,  and  social  interactions  of
nationalist Internet users in China. In other words, both books avoid simplistic and
judgmental  views  of  nationalism  and  provide  useful  theoretical  perspectives  to
understand it in context.
 
Structures: The political economy of nationalism
10 To be sure, censorship on the Chinese Internet leaves only limited space for discourses
that diverge from official positions. Both books address the institutional set up, which
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constrains expression of popular sentiment, including nationalism. They cover some of
the main steps in the development of the Great Firewall, which entails technological
aspects as well as regulatory and institutional ones. This includes, for example, the Real
Name  System ( Shi  ming  zhi  实名制),  and  reorganisation  of  the  Cyberspace
Administration of China. 
11 The state outsources control to Internet service providers through the moderation of
user-generated content. This puts corporations in a difficult situation where they need
to assess what content crosses the line,  and arrange sanctions that can range from
reducing the visibility  of  a  post  to  removing it,  and to  deleting the  user’s  account
altogether.  In  other  words,  Internet  service  providers  find  themselves  in  an
uncomfortable position “between the Party line and the bottom line” (Jiang 2012 based
on Zhao 1998). This leads to variations across platforms in terms of what content is
censored, and when (MacKinnon 2009). 
12 Han Rongbin (Chapter 3) shows how corporations are constantly walking a fine line, as
their  profits  depend  on  attracting  lively  discussion.  Some  resort  to  “discontented
compliance”  (p.  55),  with  tactics  including  grumbling,  slacking  (dragging  feet),
technical boycotting, managerial activism (lobbying to the authorities), and even “exit
and resurrection” (p. 69). How these different tactics play out depends, of course, on
the  size  and  affiliation  of  the  corporations,  with  the  largest  commercial  portals
particularly under scrutiny, but also with greater bargaining power.
13 Hosting nationalist content therefore appears to be an easy way to produce lively (or
even inflamed) debate and attract audiences, with little political risk. Florian Schneider
addresses this question in the last chapter of his book. He suggests that the “resulting
network architecture benefits China’s political and commercial elites while at the same
time  satisfying  certain  user  demands,  but  it  also  creates  a  media  ecology  that
encourages nationalism” (p. 192), although he notes that other kinds of narratives still
emerge occasionally.
14 Beyond the mere application of censorship directives, nationalist discourse is shaped
by corporate policies in more mundane ways. For example, in Chapter 3,  Schneider
compares search engine results from Baidu (百度), Good Search (好搜 by Qihoo 360 奇
虎 360, now known as So 搜), Sogou (搜狗), ChinaSo (中国搜索), and Google. Each of the
search results show selection biases, such as censorship and self-promotion. State-run
search  engine  ChinaSo  promoted  its  own  affiliated  content  in  60%  of  the  queries,
whereas all Chinese commercial search engines did so between 30 and 39% of the time.
Because these platforms can only publish state-approved content about issues such as
the Nanjing massacre  or  the Diaoyu Island,  self-promotion reduces  the diversity  of
perspectives available. Google was found to promote Google-affiliated content in about
4% of queries, but it returned materials produced by the Chinese Party-state 18% of the
time, reflecting the organic ways in which information sources emerge as authoritative
from  the  Chinese  language  online  ecosystem.  Schneider  also  shows  the  impact  of
“banal  biases,”  such  as  the  automatic  display  of  weather  or  tourism  information
concerning the Diaoyu Islands, although they are in fact inaccessible to anyone.
 
Old and new features of propaganda 
15 The  framing  of  online  nationalism  also  happens  through  the  state-sponsored
publication of content. Schneider collected the 19 most visible websites (according to
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search  results)  dedicated  to  the  Nanjing  Massacre  and  to  the  Diaoyu  Islands  and
concluded  that  these  websites  reflect  publication  patterns  directly  imported  from
traditional media. First, contrary to expectations, they are “not tied into anything that
can be called an issue network” (Chapter 4, p. 95). In other words, they do not link to
each other. Instead, they seem to maintain a traditional mass-media logic with very
little interactivity or links to sources of information, which goes against the culture of
“see for yourself” that characterises the web. 
16 In terms of content (Chapter 5), these mostly institutional websites tend to display a
one-way  communication  pattern  that  is  not  conducive  to  exchange  or  critical
examination  of  data.  Sites  dedicated  to  the  Nanjing  Massacre,  such  as  the  Nanjing
Massacre Memorial Hall website (Qin Hua Rijun Nanjing da tusha yunan tongbao jinianguan
侵华日军南京大屠杀遇难同胞纪念馆) and the Never Forget (Yong bu wangque 永不忘
却) commemoration site on Sina.com, tend to perform the function of a shrine, with
prominent use of emotional vocabulary and visuals. Websites dedicated to the Diaoyu
Islands (Chapter 6) put forward a strategy of “measuring, counting, and naming” (p.
138), as a performative action that constructs sovereignty. 
17 This  logic  also  underlies  the  fabrication  of  content  about  the  Nanjing  Massacre  in
participative  encyclopaedias  such  as  Baidu  Baike 百度百科 or  Hudong  互動百科 
(Chapter  5).  All  China-based  encyclopaedias  have  an  additional  editorial  layer
conducted by employees of the platform, unlike Wikipedia, which is entirely written
and edited by volunteer users (Liao 2015). Compared to China-hosted services, Chinese
Wikipedia has the longest and most referenced entry on the Nanjing Massacre. It is a
patchwork of contributions with scholarly and casual discourses partly contradicting
each other,  but  that  precisely  puts  the emphasis  on the need to  take into account
different perspectives. By way of contrast, the Chinese encyclopaedias present a much
simpler, edited, and apparently uncontroversial version of events, with little attention
to sources or editorial ethics (Baidu and Hudong replicate Wikipedia and each other).
18 Schneider  also  highlights  that  such  a  hot  topic  as  the  Diaoyu  Islands  generated  a
diversity  of  websites,  including  some  run  by  (pro-China)  volunteer  groups,  and  by
various pro-Beijing organisations in Hong Kong, for example. The Diaoyu Islands are
also  a  prominent  topic  on  commercial  military  sites.  These  websites  tend to  reuse
official  discourse  but  also  re-appropriate  that  content  in  unorthodox  ways,  and
incorporate less tidy features. For example, some of them display very misogynistic
characteristics,  both  in  the  language  used  and  in  the  suggestive  advertisements
displayed. Florian Schneider’s hypothesis is that commercial dynamics constitute an
encouragement to construct the issue in a nationalistic and misogynistic way, which is
most  likely  to  attract  specific  audiences.  In  other  words,  nationalism  has  been
“commodified” (Chapter 6, p. 159).
19 Florian  Schneider’s  extensive  examination  shows  the  clear  weaknesses  of  state-
sponsored and state-approved commercial content. Stuck in twentieth-century forms
of publication, ignoring web-native referencing and linking practices, and with built-in
incentives to favour misogynistic, aggressive, emotional types of expression, they lack
credibility  and  appeal.  Because  of  the  extent  of  censorship  and  bias  in  online
information gatekeepers, they still occupy a dominant position online, and one has to
dig into search results and sub-threads of comments in order to find expressions of
more diversity. 
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20 However, his choice of fieldwork does not allow Schneider to account sufficiently for
the  new  strategies  devised  by  propaganda  departments  to  modernise  their
communication and strike a chord with younger generations. 
21 First,  it  appeared quite early that the state was paying commentators to engage in
astroturfing,  a  classic  public  relations  strategy  that  consists  in  flooding  online
platforms  with  positive  comments,  under  the  pretence  of  being  regular  users
(Bandurski  2008).  Their  posts  are highly recognisable,  as  they tend to use identical
phrases,  and  they  often  get  chastised  online  for  upholding  the  government’s
propaganda.
22 Han Rongbin’s Chapter 5 digs deeper and unearths propaganda directives and official
websites that explain the strategy candidly.  State-sponsored trolls  were firstly local
initiatives,  then spread all  around the country,  and they are now supplemented by
national  organisations such as the Communist  Youth League.  The latter can recruit
large numbers of commentators nationally, notably in universities. They are mobilised
in waves at times of crisis, or to help spread and clarify state policies. 
23 Han Rongbin  shows  that  the  low level  of  remuneration  and  training  indicates  low
expectations. Posters rarely engage in substantial exchanges with other Internet users
and simply repeat typical elements of language that no one takes seriously anymore.
This is counterproductive. However, as other scholars have pointed out, the main goal
may  simply  be  to  distract  or  repel  readers,  not  to  convince  them  (King,  Pan,  and
Roberts 2016).  In fact,  despite the apparent clumsiness of  the strategy,  elements of
language from Chinese propaganda do travel around the global Internet (Roberts 2018,
Chapter 6). Beyond astroturfing, Chinese propaganda has developed a range of more
sophisticated strategies. 
24 Over  the  years,  the  Chinese  propaganda  apparatus  recognised the  importance  of
communicating  in  ways  that  appeal  to  the  younger  generation  online.  Indeed  Han
Rongbin’s Chapter 4 shows how popular culture has become a vector of activism, in
playful  ways that are not easily classified as political  or apolitical,  and thus escape
censorship easier. 
25 Recognising this, the Communist Youth League (Gongchanzhuyi Qingnian Tuan 共产主义
青年团) and major news organisations such as People’s  Daily (Renmin ribao 人民日报) 
have  been  instrumental  in  devising  ways  to  leverage  popular  culture  and
entertainment for nationalistic purposes. For instance, the gaming industry has been
co-opted to produce games featuring historical events such as the “War of Resistance
against  Japan,”  with  mixed results  (Nie  2013).  More  recently,  the  turn to  a  cult  of
personality for president Xi Jinping also involved the production of popular cultural
content, such as songs, cartoons, and anime (Chang and Ren 2018). But concurrently,
Internet users produced satirical content, including a meme comparing Xi to Winnie
the Pooh, which was eventually deleted from some platforms. 
26 Other case studies show how propaganda departments and official media organisations
have turned to Weibo to display a more empathetic discourse and create a sense of
community (Li 2015).
27 The sarcastic and at times aggressive reactions of Chinese audiences to nationalistic
content promoted by the state already complicate the understanding of the origins of
online nationalism in China, as it becomes difficult to just assume that Chinese Internet
users are manipulated by propaganda. However, the emergence of clear evidence of
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voluntary, non-state sponsored online nationalism is bringing even more complexity
into this picture.
 
Collective identity and popular culture
28 Probably  the  most  interesting  chapter  in  Han  Rongbin’s  book  is  the  case  of  the
“voluntary  50-cent  army,”  Internet  commentators  who  are  not  paid  for  their  pro-
regime contributions (Chapter 7, p. 152). He finds them primarily on military discussion
boards, but also shows that they increasingly populate more mainstream discussion
boards. 
29 Han Rongbin shows that their tactics often revolve around showing the logical flaws of
regime critics.  Factual errors by the international press, like CNN’s use of a picture
from Nepal to illustrate a story about riots in Lhasa in 2008, are scrutinised as further
proof that pro-democracy actors cannot be trusted. Voluntary 50-cents can even go as
far as fabricating information to “hook” victims into spreading false criticism, only
then to denounce their gullibility. They claim a superior rationality, which allegedly
cannot be biased by emotion. This claim becomes part of their collective identity. 
30 This rhetoric has been all the more effective as state-sponsored trolls are not the only
actors  engaged  in  astroturfing  (Chapter  6).  Pro-democracy  actors  have  also  had  to
resort to guerrilla-style strategies to reach out to Chinese audiences, for example by
pushing topics to the top of portal rankings. Some groups such as Falungong (法轮功)
have  used  mailing  campaigns  (in  other  terms,  spamming),  exaggerated  images  or
vocabulary,  and  personal  attacks  against  the  leaders.  As  Han  Rongbin  notes,  such
tactics  are  the  “weapons  of  the  weak”  when  more  open,  regulated  platforms  for
expression  are  not  available  to  them.  However,  they  give  ground  to  conspiracy
theories, which in turn spur nationalism. 
31 Voluntary 50-cents’ practices diverge from state-sponsored tactics in many ways. They
are active on smaller-scale forums, including overseas;  they engage in debates with
other Internet users, and create viral content; they even at times debate the merits and
faults of state leaders and use idioms traditionally typical of dissidents. In that, they are
more difficult to control by the propaganda system, although they have become one of
its strongest assets.
32 Indeed,  Han Rongbin’s  insights  into  the  world  of  the  voluntary  50-cent  army echo
previous research on nationalism in China, which also found that this is not a one-
sided,  straightforward  phenomenon.  For  example,  anti-Japanese  demonstrations  in
2006  were  mostly  spontaneous,  and  participants  diverged  quite  substantially  from
official propaganda (Liu 2006). Another study of nationalist Weibo posts showed that
nationalist  Internet  users  couldn’t  be  easily  classified  as  supporters  of  the  regime
(Zhang, Liu, and Wen 2018). More recently, Liu Hailong’s edited book (2019) further
disentangled the “fandom” and identity dynamics of nationalist activities online.
33 These nationalist movements are indeed a challenge for the Party-state. On the one
side,  they  often  receive  support  or  at  least  little  interference  from the  authorities
despite  the  violence  of  some  calls  to  action.  They  can  serve  as  a  lever  in  Chinese
diplomacy,  as  the  authorities  could  argue  that  they  had  to  respond  to  popular
sentiment (Wu 2007). On the other side, the authorities have regularly had to step in
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with increased censorship to protect diplomatic relationships and keep public order
under control.
34 This complicated relationship, as Florian Schneider shows in Chapter 7, is often one of
negotiated meanings. He studies posts by some of the most influential opinion leaders
on Weibo during the Diaoyu Islands crisis and notes that many of them navigated the
crisis either by limiting their posts on the topic to mere retweets or insignificant posts,
or by using ambiguous, somewhat ironic language. 
35 Schneider shows that the configuration of the platform matters. More or less visibility,
the  intended  purpose  of  the forum,  and  the  kind  of  people  who  populate  it  all
contribute to shaping what is perceived as accepted discourse (also see Arsène 2011,
Chapter 6). Paradoxically, the advent of WeChat (Weixin 微信), a more private instant
messaging platform launched in 2011, does not necessarily make this negotiation any
easier, as users interact with family, friends, or colleagues, people they know and with
whom they need to respect particular norms of interaction. “Familiar friend circles
indeed promotes discourse that is responsible, civilized, and in good taste” (p. 192).
Besides, we also know that the platform censors content very heavily, including private
chats (Ng et al. 2016). Arguably, one could add that timing counts as well. Under times
of  crisis,  the lines tend to move in unpredictable ways,  as  the coronavirus crisis  is
showing, with Internet users dropping all sense of patriotism to criticise the regime’s
handling of the crisis, while propaganda organs are engaged in a disinformation battle
to contest the Chinese origins of the virus.1
 
Brutalisation of public debate
36 Through different fieldworks and methods, both authors come to the same conclusion.
The  pervasive  censorship,  manipulation,  and  polarisation  of  public  space  that  is
occurring in the Chinese cyberspace means that the entire public sphere suffers from a
lack of  credibility  and is  hostile  to  any constructive debate,  something akin to  the
“brutalisation of public debate” conceptualised by Badouard (2018). 
37 Han Rongbin shows how a logic  of  “us versus them” prevails  in  the labelling wars
between 50-centers and pro-democracy activists (“50-cent” 五毛 versus “pussies” 普世 
for  pushi, universalism).  As  he  concludes,  “online  expression  has  done  more  to
delegitimize the regime than to spread civic and democratic norms” (p. 190). 
38 Florian  Schneider  also  concludes  with  the  destruction  of  democratic  values  online.
Based  on  Mumford  (1964),  he  argues  that  the  Chinese  Internet  is  marked  by
paternalistic,  centralising  technics of  government,  and more  importantly  that  those
technics are not exclusively features of an authoritarian regime. In other terms, this
pattern  is  visible  whenever  nationalism  thrives  online.  This  is  the  strong  message
underlying both books.  Although these  case  studies  were  conducted in  China,  they
convey  important  implications  for  the  rest  of  the world,  including  in  democratic
regimes.  It  is  one  thing  to  fight  against  censorship,  propaganda,  fake  news,  and
manipulation.  Another  challenge  altogether  is  how  to  build  the  conditions  for  an
inclusive, peaceful, and constructive public space. 
LIU, Hailong (ed.). 2019. From Cyber-Nationalism to Fandom Nationalism : The Case of Diba Expedition In
China. London: Routledge. 
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